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Critical realism and economic anthropology 
 
This paper discusses basic critical realism within the context of economic 
anthropology and develops an approach to studying material relations between 
people. A diachronic form of analysis, following the work of Bhaskar and Archer, 
is described as a practical means of analysing property rights. This new approach 
emphasises epistemic relativism and ontological realism in order to compare 
disparate forms of human interaction across cultures. The aim of doing this is to 
develop a philosophical framework that allows for the comparison of economic 
practices without resorting to judgemental relativism. The implications are 
significant for institutional economics and anthropology alike, particularly for 
researchers examining multiple overlapping practices such as market and gift 
exchange.                                                     
Keywords: economic anthropology, social structure, property rights  
 
Giving out or giving in? Epistemological ambiguity and economic interaction 
Giving, sharing, buying, selling, exchanging, swapping, taking, stealing, borrowing, 
lending, loaning, investing, inheriting, donating, receiving, sacrificing ... 
The words shown above are used in everyday language, by laypersons and academics 
alike, to describe ways in which humans interact. The history of anthropology reminds us 
that these concepts are often culturally specific rather than universal. For instance, if we 
speak of ‘giving’, we may be referring to giving presents, giving alms, giving time, giving 
up, giving in, giving out, giving things, giving ideas, giving permission, giving dowry, 
giving blood, or even giving people, depending on when and to whom we speak. Defining 
universal forms of human interaction is therefore challenging because meaning often 
appears to be situational or dependent on local variables. Indeed, issues of classification 
are the primary reason that some anthropologists have discouraged comparison between 
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cultures, and - in doing so -  have fundamentally challenged the basis of the discipline 
(see for instance, the recent debate in HAU Journal - 'Incomplete regularities', da Col, 
2015). If social practices can only be understood by means of localised historical 
accounts, after all, why bother comparing cultures? This question, and our rebuke, form 
the basis of this article. It advances an argument which entails that comparisons of human 
interaction are not only possible, they are imperative if anthropology is to provide a full 
and proper account of the way economies form. The basis of the comparative method 
presented for consideration draws explicitly on the critical realist notions of ontological 
realism and epistemic relativism. To paraphrase Bhaskar (2002,39), knowledge is part of 
reality. Indeed, epistemology, properly understood, is a part of ontology, as competing 
beliefs exist in the same world as the objects about which they (aim to) speak.  
To fully articulate an approach based on these positions, the first section of this article 
will begin by considering some recurring ontological themes in economic anthropology, 
all of which have pulled this field of study in opposite directions. The article then moves 
on, in the second section, to consider the question ‘what must the world be like for humans 
to be able to form economies?’, and it suggests that reality is to some extent pre-
categorised by the economic goods around us. Indeed, in line with Bhaskar’s approach 
this section will argue that reality is ‘always already pre-categorised […] prior to and 
independently of any human categorisation of it’ (Hartwig 2007, xvii). In short, categories 
are not something humans impose on reality, they are literally the stuff of reality itself. 
Bhaskar argued that the intelligibility of categories, and thus the possibility of scientific 
knowledge, depends on the interrelation between two separate domains: the transitive and 
the intransitive. The transitive domain constitutes the ways in which humans collectively 
interpret, describe and theorise existence.  In the context of this article this domain 
therefore contains shared forms of property rights. The intransitive domain, by contrast, 
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consists of those aspects of the world which exist independently of scientific practice, but 
are nonetheless the intended targets of our knowledge claims.   
 
We subsequently argue, in the third section of the article, that the wide variety of 
observable political economies has led many anthropologists towards synchronic forms 
of analysis, particularly practice-based approaches, which fail to provide explanatory 
accounts of social change. We suggest that the critical realist canon can help to provide a 
potential resolution to the recurring debates that were discussed in the previous 
section. This initial proposition will then be used as a springboard for developing a 
philosophical framework which allows for the diachronic analysis of property rights. This 
approach attempts to avoid relativist descriptions of human interaction by focusing 
explicitly on the importance of ontological realism. 
 
Give and you shall receive - Recurring themes in economic anthropology  
For the past century, economic anthropology has been concerned with the ways in which 
people from different parts of the world produce, consume, and exchange both themselves 
and the things around them. Comprehensive histories of the discipline, which document 
its engagement with these key themes, have been written in recent years (e.g. Hart and 
Hann 2011; Chibnik 2015; Carrier 2005; Wilk and Cliggett 2007). Our aim in this article 
is therefore not to repeat such work. Nonetheless, it is worth starting out by briefly 
reiterating some prominent discussions before examining what contribution critical 
realism might be able to make to them.  
In seminal work by economic anthropologists such as by Boas, Mauss or Malinowski, 
there is a common fixation on the ways in which things are exchanged and circulate 
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between people. Typical questions ask: in which direction do objects of value circulate? 
Why do people exchange seemingly trivial things without practical function? Can moral 
equivalence ever be achieved through economic exchange? And, does reciprocity 
underpin all human relations? The extent to which observed actions can be described in 
utilitarian terms as either selfish or selfless, interested or disinterested formed much of 
the debate that followed. Importantly, this debate was not restricted to just the English-
speaking world. The Revue du Mauss in France, for instance, was created explicitly as an 
attempt to counter inappropriate utilitarian interpretations of Maussian thought (Caille, 
2014). 
These tensions persist today, and have led to several notable disagreements. For instance, 
a major tension in 20th century economic anthropology emerged from a conflict between 
anthropologists who adopted 'formalist' and 'substantivist' perspectives. This distinction 
is no longer a major focus for discussion, although arguably it should be, because many 
of the issues that were identified by both sides have not yet been resolved. As Hart and 
Hann (2011) note, the formalism/substantivism debate was essentially a rehashing of the 
methodenstreit (or 'Battle of Methods') that occurred in Germany during the late 19th 
Century. The historical accounts mentioned previously provide an extensive discussion 
of the debate, but - for the purposes of this article - it is worth beginning this section by 
quoting a passage from Chibnik (2015) in full, which eloquently summarises a number 
of the key issues:   
‘The formalists (e.g. Burling 1962; LeClair 1962; Cook 1966) thought that economics is 
about methods used to analyze decision making in situations where resources were 
scarce. They argued that methods such as cost-benefit analyses could be used in all 
sociocultural settings. The substantivists (e.g. Dalton 1961) said that economics is about 
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institutions associated with production, consumption, and (especially) exchange. They 
argued that in places where markets were non-existent, most choices are not the result of 
individuals carrying out informal cost-benefit analyses. Instead, these choices are 
“embedded” in institutional settings with particular cultural norms.’ 
Substantivists therefore reject the idea that economic transactions can be understood in 
isolation, insisting instead that they must be understood as ‘a momentary episode in a 
continuous social relation’ (Sahlins 1968, p.139). The ontology of substantivism 
emphasises the importance of culture and social structure, rather than simply the 
behaviour of individuals. When using the word ‘economy’ substantivists are therefore 
really referring to a sub-category of cultural interaction, rather than the rationalising 
behaviour of people in the face of scarce resources, as is typical of the economics 
discipline.  This emphasis on the embedded nature of economic transactions led them to 
describe basic archetypes of social interaction. For Levi-Strauss (1949/1969) and Sahlins 
(1979) these archetypes centred around reciprocal forms of interaction, whereas for 
Polanyi (1944, 1957) economic provisioning occurred through three distinct forms: 
market exchange, reciprocity, and redistribution. A methodological criticism that is 
commonly levelled at attempts to explain economic behaviour in these archetypical ways 
is that it leaves no scope for the agency of individuals. If all economic behaviour is 
classified as reciprocal, after all, there is no potential to explain transformations of social 
structure through agency. The ontology of substantivism therefore lacks ‘depth’, and, in 
Archer’s terms, results in the fallacy of downward conflation, which is the ‘presumption 
that the forces of socialisation simply imprint themselves as beliefs upon agency’ (2003, 
51).   
Formalists, by contrast, argue in favour of a utilitarian perspective that privileges 
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methodological individualism, and their work thus presupposes no such ‘basic’ forms of 
social interaction. This approach experienced its heyday in the ‘neoclassical’ work of 
Becker (1976), and the ontology which it employs, like the substantivist ontology, is flat. 
The agency of the individual is the object of study, while any social/cultural properties 
and powers are understood as the epiphenomenal effects of other people. In Archer’s 
terms this type of approach therefore involves a form of upward conflation.  Proponents 
on either side of the debate make distinct ontological commitments, while rejecting 
others.  As Sahlins (1969, 15) has rightly noted ‘at issue … is the ontological locus of 
economy. The disagreement is thereby decisive: all other differences of method and 
conception follow logically from it.’    
Even at the height of this debate it was therefore noted that both sides were effectively 
‘talking past one another’ and ‘operating within separate spheres of discourse’ (Cook  
1966, 323). We believe that this situation has continued for the past 50 years, even if the 
debate has taken on new names. In general, anthropology and economics seem to have 
fallen out, as each discipline ekes out a justification for its own separate existence. 
Although it is encouraging to see recent anthropological debates over ontology such as 
the one between Viveiros de Castro (2015) and Graeber (2015) – the latter of whom writes 
from a critical realist perspective - ontology is rarely an area of explicit discussion 
between economists and anthropologists.  
One key reason for this is the fact that researchers are increasingly choosing to privilege 
‘practice’ theories (particularly inspired by the work of Wittgenstein or Bourdieu 1977, 
1984) and local descriptions. Practices are described as being in opposition to approaches 
that impose fixed concepts on the subject of study. One positive consequence of taking 
practices as the unit of sociological analysis in this way has been the fact that it highlights 
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how traditional base/superstructure, market/mutuality or gift/commodity dualisms result 
in misleading conclusions, because they wrongly suppose a universal economic morality. 
Research utilising practice theory has therefore also critiqued the notion of property 
rights, and has even critiqued individual personhood itself. Both concepts can be 
considered problematic from this perspective if they are applied to people who simply do 
not imagine themselves in strict binary terms such as those that are inherent to Cartesian 
subject/object dualism. Strathern (1988) and Wagner (1991), for instance, describe ‘how 
Melanesians typically interact as composite beings constituted of the detached 
parts/relationships of other persons through prior agentive elicitations and exchanges’ 
(quoted in Mosko 2010, 215).  More broadly, ethnographic insights into the range of ways 
in which people conceptualise themselves and the world around them have led some 
anthropologists, such as Gudeman (2008,32), to view the task of the interlocutor as one 
that reproduces people's own economic constructions, taking into account their conjoint 
or disjoint sense of self.  
There are numerous critical realist commentaries on issues relating to practice-based 
studies (Archer 2000; Bonnington 2015; Ashraf and Uddin 2015) and it is not our aim to 
rehearse the critiques that these commentaries have produced here. It is worth noting, 
however, that, for Wittgenstein, it was sufficient for philosophers to 'treat only the 
network and not what the network describes' (Wittgenstein 1961, 6:35). This is 
insufficient if we are to account for the ontological basis of economics, or, in other words, 
to account for the ways in which people interact with different categories of goods. 
Critical realists, in contrast to formalists, substantivists, and practice theorists, speak of 
‘depth’ or ‘stratified’ ontologies as central to social interaction, and, in this way, they 
provide an alternative meta-theoretical basis that – we will argue - can account for 
structure, agency, and culture without reducing one to (the) other(s).   In the following 
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section we discuss how anthropologists have thought about the ways ontology influences 
economics, before developing a critical realist-informed method that would allow them 
to study the transformation of economies.   
Economic goods and the pre-categorisation of social reality 
According to Bhaskar (2002/2012), people misunderstand the nature of categories; they 
think, like Kant, that categories are things that we impose on reality. To the contrary, 
Bhaskar suggested that categories are real, and that they are constitutive of reality itself. 
Therefore, for Bhaskar, causality is not a schema that we impose on reality; it is actually 
out there. Furthermore, the subject matter of philosophy, traditionally defined as the 
understanding of categories, must now be defined as reality itself, as being. As Bhaskar 
explains:  
 
This becomes very important when we move to the social world because we can then 
argue: reality is pre-categorised, but in the social world the way in which reality is 
categorised may be false. Social reality is conceptually dependent; the categories in terms 
of which we understand social reality may be systematically illusory, or misleading, and 
that is the clue to the concept of ideology. (Bhaskar 2002/2012,54) 
 
So how is social reality pre-categorised?  In Bhaskar’s account, pre-categorisation is a 
result of structure and essence.  Indeed, as Rutzou (2017, 10) notes, the role of the scientist 
is said ‘to move beyond collecting conjunctions of events towards ‘the things themselves’; 
the essence behind the appearance which accounts for the appearance’, and these ‘things 
can be grouped together based on their common constitution ‘despite their manifest 
sensible differences’ (Bhaskar, 1975/2008, 201). In other words, essences and structures 
in Bhaskar represent the more fundamental nature of things, and the more fundamental 
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things of nature.’  Essentialist accounts of social interaction have often been resisted in 
anthropology, but there are nonetheless a limited number of examples that have had an 
influence. The structuralism of Levi-Strauss provides an obvious example from the mid-
20th century. Like Marx and Freud before him, Levi-Strauss (1955/2011, 57) described 
the social scientist’s role as one that uncovers knowledge, and he maintained that - despite 
the many observable variants of human interaction – social phenomena possess stable 
underlying structural characteristics. In the past two decades there have been other 
attempts by anthropologists to describe the way social reality is pre-categorised. These 
approaches have sought, in particular, to address the issue of reciprocity, which Levi-
Strauss placed centre-stage throughout his work. Two researchers whose work on these 
issues has been influential are Fiske (1991, 1992) and Descola (2013; 2014).   
 
Fiske has developed a typology of social interaction based on extensive ethnographic 
evidence. The four ‘elementary’ forms of social interaction that, he suggests, occur 
among all people are: ‘Communal Sharing’, ‘Authority Ranking’, ‘Equality Matching’, 
and ‘Market Pricing’. These four forms, Fiske argues, are generative epistemological 
schemata, in the sense that children of all cultures are born prepared to recognise these 
forms in later life, and, in being able to do so, can participate in collective action and 
moral judgement. Although the prevalence of these forms will vary in different groups of 
people they are said to be ‘fundamental, in the sense that they are the lowest or most 
basic-level “grammars” for social relations’ (1991, 25) 
 
Descola rejects the essentialist reciprocity of Levi-Strauss as an inappropriate leitmotif 
that recurs throughout Western thought, and begins from a different starting point than 
Fiske. Though he concedes that humans share a basic set of cognitive and sensory-motor 
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dispositions, he argues that the task of the anthropologist is to investigate why some 
cultures privilege salient features of social and environmental relations, whereas others 
ignore them. His central thesis is that all human interaction (and cultural variation) results 
from a limited but varied set of ontological predicates, or ways of apprehending the 
world/being. These predicates influence the way people subsequently pick out salient 
features of culture and nature (a dualism he suggests results from a Western account of 
knowledge). The extent to which these features are socially significant accounts for the 
ways in which people understand and relate to other organisms, whether human or non-
human, and forms the basis of how people classify the world around them. The four 
ontological predicates distinguished by means of Descola’s phenomenological insights 
are supported by a range of ethnographic evidence and are termed: ‘animism’, ‘totemism’, 
‘analogism’, and ‘naturalism’. These four common tropes have recurred throughout the 
history of anthropology. There is clear merit in using these proposed distinctions as a 
basis for general comparison, because it helps us to move beyond the ethnocentrism that 
is present in so much of anthropology. However, Descola’s use of the word ‘ontology’ 
potentially introduces some confusion about the proposed object of anthropology and the 
role of the researcher. As Searle (2010) notes, there are at least two different senses of 
the objective/subjective distinction: one that relates to knowledge (epistemology) and one 
that relates to existence itself (ontology). A pain or an itch is ontologically subjective 
because it only exists insofar as it is experienced by a human subject. In contrast, a 
mountain or a tree can be said to be ontologically objective, as their mode of being does 
not depend upon a knowing subject. Itches and mountains are both real, but they are 
manifestations of different modes of existence. The epistemic sense in which an 
objective/subjective distinction can be applied therefore relates to what is being claimed 
in a proposition. For instance, the statement ‘Roy Bhaskar died in England’ is 
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epistemically objective.  Its truth or falsity can be interrogated regardless of the attitudes 
of observers.  However, the statement ‘Roy Bhaskar is the greatest philosopher to have 
ever lived’ is epistemically subjective, it depends upon the knowledge and opinions of 
the observer. One of the main challenges for anthropologists hence occurs during 
classification, when trying to distinguish between claims (the epistemic status of 
statements) and entities (modes of existence).  
 
Both Descola and Fiske have, in their own respective ways, described the way social 
reality results from pre-categorised forms of interaction that occur because of the 
presence, or indeed absence, of particular epistemological schemata. These initial 
building blocks of human thought, which form the basis of social relationships, are 
described in prototypical terms. They are universal features of human thought but, when 
they are observed ethnographically or when the descriptions that people give of 
themselves are interpreted, the inevitable consequence is analytical hybridity. That is to 
say, the forms of human practices that are observed are seldom of the prototypical form 
initially imagined, so they appear as polythetic or fuzzy categoriesi.  We believe there is 
merit in such approaches, but also feel that they result in an overlap between epistemology 
and ontology that requires clarification.  We are interested in providing such clarification 
by asking the question: ‘what must the world be like for humans to be able to form 
economies?’ We believe that, in order to provide an answer to this question, the 
ontological basis of human interaction must first be considered. As critical realist thought 





Bhaskar (1975/1977, 1998) and Archer (1982, 1995, 2007, 2012) offer the clearest 
methods in the critical realist canon for identifying the ontological presuppositions of 
social interaction. Bhaskar’s Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA) and 
Archer’s Morphogenetic Sequence both describe ontological commitments that are 
maintained regardless of context. As others have noted (Porpora 2015; Gorski 2013), 
however, ontological presuppositions cannot explain anything in isolation, they must be 
built upon. It is common for critical realists to speak of the ontological basis of social 
structure, sometimes described as the ‘material relations’ that exist between people. 
However, less attention has typically been paid to the material world itself, to which social 
relations are assumed to relate. A recent example of this is apparent in the work of Donati 
and Archer (2015,199), in which goods are described as ‘intangibles’ that are the 
consequence of collective intentionality. This description is unlike other influential 
contemporary theories and theorists that have attempted to describe the metaphysical 
basis of socio-materiality, including such approaches as Actor-Network Theory (Latour 
2005), Assemblage Theory (Delanda 2006, 2016), Object-Oriented Ontology (Harman 
2010, 2016; Bryant 2011), and Material Engagement Theory (Malafouris 2013). These 
forms of inquiry all give more explicit consideration to things, regardless of whether they 
are human or not. In this respect, critical realist economists and anthropologists have 
perhaps not emphasised the ‘ontology of things’ that Bhaskar outlined in A Realist Theory 
of Science (1977, 223) to a sufficient degree. For Archer (2000, 168) the affordances of 
objects and their dispositional capacity to be understood is central to her account of 
culture. Likewise, for Bhaskar, the enduring structure of particular kinds – whether they 
are emeralds, figs, desk lamps, or cabinet ministers - is what makes science possible. We 
contend that the methods of economic anthropology can be bolstered by re-examining 
Bhaskar’s claim that ‘things persist’ (ibid). Indeed, more specifically, this can be 
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achieved by considering how different types of goods serve as antecedent generative 
mechanisms for human interaction.     
 
In institutional economics, things in the material world are generally referred to as 'goods', 
particularly following the work of Ostrom (who expanded on the work of Samuelson 
1954; and Musgrave 1959). In Ostrom's account goods pre-categorise what we might do 
with them. A simple matrix can be constructed by asking whether a good is a) excludable 
(i.e. can a person prevent another from interacting with it?), and b) subtractable (i.e. if 
one person interacts with a good, does this prevent someone else from interacting with 
it?).  Asking these two basic questions gives the following four categories of goods (Hess 
and Ostrom 2003,120) : 
 
1) Public Goods: Low subtractability and difficult to exclude 
2) Common-Pool Goods: High subtractability and difficult to exclude 
3) Club Goods: Low subtractability and easy to exclude 
4) Private Goods: High subtractability and easy to exclude 
  
These four categories of goods provide a basic insight into how people interact with 
goods, and should arguably be commended by critical realists because they clearly 
delineate different types of goods from the property rights that people assign to those 
goods. This is important because it allows for the possibility that qualitatively different 
property rights may simultaneously overlap between people for one type of good.  Goods 
are ontologically real and are associated with competing relative claims of ownership.  
 The great strength of Bhaskar's TMSA and Archer's Morphogenetic Sequence, however, 
is that they describe change in the social structure through time. This feature is not 
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explicitly mentioned in the model that is shown above, and we therefore suggest that an 
extra feature worth considering is simultaneity during interaction. If we aim to understand 
human interaction in synchronic terms the table above provides an initial starting point, 
but we would argue that it is more important that changes in structure are able to be 
analysed diachronically. The T-variable is of key importance because it contributes to 
what we can do with goods. For example, you can read this paper and then give it to your 
friend to read, but it is harder to read it simultaneously without some potentially awkward 
manoeuvring! Ostrom’s work shows how property rights can exist simultaneously, and 
how they can overlap for multiple individual people and/or institutions.  In all she 
identifies seven types of property rights, summarised below (Ostrom and Hess 2007,16):  
 
1) Access: the right to enter a defined physical area and enjoy non-subtractive benefits. 
2) Contribution: the right to contribute to the content.       
3) Extraction: the right to obtain resource units or products of a resource system. 
4) Removal: the right to remove one’s artefacts from the resource.  
5) Management / Participation: the right to regulate internal use patterns and transform 
the resource by making improvements.        
6) Exclusion: the right to determine who will have access, contribution, extraction, and 
removal rights, and how those rights may be transferred. 
7) Alienation: the right to sell or lease management and exclusion rights. 
 
For any one good, multiple simultaneous property relations can apply to qualitatively 
different aspects. To give a practical example of overlapping property rights, we might 
consider the annual critical realism conference. Each year the conference alternates 
between different international host universities. Typically, the room in which conference 
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attendees discuss their work is owned by the university itself. This ownership is, in most 
cases, formalised and legally underwritten by the state, such that the university has a 
complete right of 'alienation' over the property. Senior management of the university will 
often delegate rights and responsibilities to individual schools or divisions. The dean or 
manager of the host school will usually possess the right to determine who can use the 
room for practical purposes; they thus have a right of exclusion. Researchers within a 
school are normally responsible for organising the conference, and they are therefore 
given management rights to organise a timetable for the room and arrange which speakers 
will speak and when. Delegates of the conference are permitted the right to 
extract/contribute to the room, by listening or participating in discussions. Finally, other 
members of the university staff are associated with the conference proceedings indirectly, 
from cleaners to administrative staff and catering personnel, who will likely access the 
room to contribute or maintain the subtractive benefits for the delegates. These 
distinctions help to illustrate how institutions and individuals interact synchronically 
through overlapping property rights. To understand how these deontic relations change, 
however, it is also necessary to consider the role of human agency.  
 
How can critical realism aid diachronic analysis of property rights?  
Critical realism has helped to inform studies in economics, economic sociology, and 
economic anthropology alike (e.g. Lawson 2003; Elder-Vass 2015; Graeber 2001, 2015). 
We contend, however, that critical realist ontology can help support retroductive forms 
of explanation for all forms of economic interaction. In order to understand why we 
believe this to be the case it is necessary to, first, acknowledge the fact that the self-
conceptualisation that people make use of when they interact is of course not universal.  
Indeed, culturally-specific varieties of epistemology are sometimes described by 
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anthropologists as incommensurable cosmogonies of thought. This is a tension that 
Bhaskar explicitly discussed with others, including the discourse analyst Ernesto Laclau. 
In an illuminating discussion between the two, the latter suggested the following: 
  
"Just as you speak your native language before you learn its grammar and the task of the 
grammarian is to bring out the immanent grammatical structure which constitutes that 
language, so the task of the discourse analyst is to explore the immanent grammars which 
underlie all kinds of meaningful intervention." 
      Laclau in Bhaskar 2002, 80 
 
What would an immanent grammar of economics look like? What is the social ontology 
implicit to all forms of economic interaction, regardless of the way different people think 
about the world? The critical realist position, similar to the position that is adopted by 
Laclau above, would no doubt emphasise structure, but would also include agency and 
culture. We contend that an explication of such a grammar, if possible, requires of us that 
we recognise that the process through which people acquire knowledge varies depending 
on culture and context, but we also maintain that this fact does not result in an account of 
knowledge which is rooted in judgmental relativism. Knowledge of property and property 
regimes is conceptually mediated in the same way as scientific knowledge. The economic 
objects (goods) that we define, denote, and discuss are fallible and subject to revision, but 
they nonetheless undergird our understanding of the world and our relative place within 
it.  
 
Some authors (e.g. Verdery and Humphrey 2004; Busse 2013) have rightly questioned 
the limits of a number of the analytical categories that are discussed within this article 
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such as personhood and property. These categories reinforce a Cartesian worldview and 
give rise to a particular historical epistemology. Consequently, there is a question as to 
whether property regimes are ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered in the world, or whether 
they are a Western fiction. These questions about the epistemic status of categories are 
valuable and worth considering. We contend, however, that regardless of whether people 
construe themselves as subjects/objects, or whether they have formalised property rights, 
they do share forms of collective intentionality.  Intentionality in the philosophical sense 
refers to the ‘aboutness’ of consciousness. It is the capacity of the mind by which it is 
directed at, or about, objects or states of affairs.  Whether you want to read this article, 
believe that it is raining outside, fear the dentist, or have a preference for apples over 
oranges, you are in each case in an intentional state of mind. Each of these cases is 
expressed in first-person singular. However, more generally, intentionality: 
 
‘seems to depend upon the feature that persons are material things with a degree 
of neurophysiological complexity which enables them not just, like the other 
higher-order animals, to initiate changes in a purposeful way, to monitor and 
control their performances, but to monitor the monitoring of these performances 
and to be capable of a commentary upon them’ (Bhaskar 1998,38).  
 
This second-order capacity for monitoring enables people to retrospectively comment on 
their actions, and thus allows them to communicate about their intentional objects with 
other people. Identifying and articulating such intentional objects provides the possibility 
for forms of collective intentionality e.g. ‘we believe in X deity’ or ‘we are creating a 
binding contract of repayment’. Collective intentionality is thus, by virtue of its existence, 
accompanied by relations between people, which we refer to as deontic boundaries. The 
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property rights shown in Table 2 are a Western example of deontic boundaries and an 
attempt to classify material relations in general terms. However, these relations are not 
universal schemata because they are localised and predicated upon competing 
metaphysical claims. Property rights are neither universal nor static. Instead they are both 
contextual and subject to on-going revision. Collective intentionality is a prerequisite of 
human interaction, and it is on these shared intentional objects that economic 
anthropology must focus.  The starting point for any comparative anthropological meta-
theory is whether it is generalisable, so we might begin by examining the ethnographic 
accounts that appear to explicitly contradict the presuppositions described above. For 
judgmental relativists, radical counterexamples to (supposedly universal) human 
practices are the exceptions that are used to justify their rejection of comparative method.  
 
A possible entry point to thinking about radical perspectives on property rights is 
communities that have demonstrated historical resistance to private alienation of 
property.  There are dozens of case studies (e.g. Gibson 1985; Endicott 1988) that could 
be selected here, but an interesting example of a culture that is both mindful of, and yet 
radically opposed to, private property legislation are the Hutterites of North America. 
These small communes of typically around 150 people believe in the concept of 
‘Gelassenheit’ (yielding to God) and ‘Gutgemeinschaft’ (living in a community of goods 
where everything is shared). The idea of individualised private property is rejected 
outright in such a way that ‘brethren’ (members of colonies) must forsake all concern for 
personal property in favour of a complete community of goods (Hofer 1982). Despite this 
all-encompassing form of theocratic communism, the brethren do nonetheless have 
highly-particularised forms of interaction with goods that flow through the economy. 
Divisions of labour are further a central feature of the communes, particularly for 
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religious and educational roles, despite some interdependence between responsibilities. 
Various historical studies (e.g. Peter and Whitaker 1981; Longhofer 1993; Janzen and 
Stanton 2010) have also described how these communal arrangements are contingent 
upon conflict avoidance, inter-communal forms of trading, and even individualised 
access rights to controversial goods such as mobile phones. The Hutterites therefore serve 
as an example of people with fundamentally different ideas about the moral status of 
property, but a diachronic analysis of property rights can help serve to understand how 
alternative forms of economy are structured. In economies that are opposed to money and 
exchange anthropologists must resort to studying how property rights transform across 
subsets of the population in question.   
 
As a contrast, we might examine groups of people that describe their own subjectivity 
and personhood in terms that are radically different from those that are entailed by a 
Cartesian subject/object worldview. To the best of our knowledge all human languages 
do at least provide an apparatus for people to conceptualise their ‘selves’ in relation to 
entities and events, regardless of whether the constituent persons, objects, and ‘worlds’ 
designated are understood in such terms. For example, in the Amondawa (Tupi Kawahib) 
language there is no linguistic space-time mapping, but there is nonetheless an implicit 
account of entities and inter-event relationships (see Sinha et al, 2011). This means that, 
though their language may provide obscure emic categories, the Amondawa do 
nonetheless participate in collective intentionality. Similarly, an extreme example is 
apparent in controversial debates over the grammar and cognition of the Pirahã people, a 
small group of indigenous hunter-gatherers in the Amazon rainforest (see Everett 2005; 
Nevins et al. 2009; Everett 2009). The Pirahã are monolingual and their language lacks 
words to explicitly describe cardinal or ordinal numbers, colours, or absolute directions, 
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and Everett (2005) has drawn attention to both the lack of relative clauses and the absence 
of grammatical recursion. The group has a highly egalitarian kinship structure which 
lacks social hierarchy and avoids coercion. Interestingly, they have no obvious creation 
myth and, instead, describe a perennial state of being – the world has always been as it 
currently is. Consequently, the Pirahã description of the world is akin to a kind of 
empirical realism. Even in such a restrictive language, however, it is possible to describe 
the things that circulate between people, and it is these collective intentional objects that 
should inform the description of economic life.  As Appadurai (1988, 5) has suggested:  
 
“…we have to follow the things themselves, for their meanings are inscribed in their 
forms, their uses, their trajectories. It is only through the analysis of these trajectories 
that we can interpret the human transactions and calculations that enliven things. Thus, 
even though from a theoretical point of view human actors encode things with 
significance, from a methodological point of view it is the things-in-motion that illuminate 
their human and social context. ‟  
 
Despite the huge variation illustrated by ethnographic evidence about the ways in which 
people apprehend the world, collective forms of intentionality are a prerequisite for all 
human interaction. We contend that a diachronic analysis of agency and structure can be 
used to understand the apprehension and appropriation of goods, regardless of the 
culturally specific property rights that define appropriation. If this proposition is accepted, 
it becomes possible to formalise the relationship between people in any given economy.  
What might diachronic analysis mean for anthropological method? 
“Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do they adhere 
slavishly to a script written for them by the particular intersection of social categories 
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that they happen to occupy. Their attempts at purposive action are instead embedded in 
concrete, ongoing systems of social relations.”  
(Granovetter 1985,487) 
 
Economic sociologists such as Granovetter, much like the earlier substantivists, draw 
attention to the idea that economic interaction cannot be analysed as being somehow 
separate from socio-cultural contexts. People are embedded in networks of social 
relations and the economic decisions they make as individuals are thus necessarily 
influenced by those same social relations. Various historical authors have used the 
language of 'networks' to describe economic relations. Radcliffe-Brown (1965,197), for 
instance, has suggested that the 'economic machinery of a society' could only be 
understood through a networked description of social structure. Evans-Pritchard (1940, 
17) has furthermore described the network of property rights over cattle as a fundamental 
feature of Nuer kinship, while Simmel (1950, 135) has argued that sociological analysis 
should emphasise triads ('associations of three') instead of dyads. Anthropologists have 
also, on occasion, attempted to use network theory as a basis for practical ethnographic 
research (e.g. Hage and Harary 1996). A wide range of social scientists have further 
sought to use digraphs in order to model trust, friendships, alliances, and communication 
networks to better understand human relations. However, approaches that use digraphs to 
model property relations are much less frequent in the literature than approaches that 
examine kinship or social goods.     
 
The relative lack of work examining economic property rights as networks is perhaps a 
legacy of work that promotes polythetic means of classification. Various anthropologists 
(e.g. Needham 1975; Laughlin 1993) have drawn attention to the problem of categorising 
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human activity through monothetic forms of classification. As noted earlier, analytical 
hybridity can lead to an argument for polythetic classification and the use of practice 
theory as a more appropriate means of describing human interaction. The typical 
argument for polythetic classification is that it helps to eliminate category errors and 
avoids a misplaced sense of concreteness. This stance has been particularly influential for 
anthropologists revisiting and rejecting the legitimacy of kinship categories identified by 
earlier work (e.g. Godlier 2004/2011). For Needham (1971, cvii) the general definitions 
used when defining kinship (such as incest or marriage) were - in attempting to be ‘all-
purpose words’ - actually abusive generalisations.   He went on to argue that: 
 
‘it is not that we cannot make sociological inferences, about institutions, groups, and 
persons, from the structure of a terminology, but we cannot even infer that the statuses 
denoted by any one term will have anything significant in common … Kinship is certainly 
a thoroughly misleading term and a false criterion in the comparison of social facts. It 
does not denote a discriminate class of phenomena or a distinct type of theory.’ 
 
This has significant implications for the comparative method, because it illustrates the 
necessity of epistemic relativism. For instance, in economic anthropology it means that 
when an observer sees a one-way transfer of material wealth they should restrict 
themselves from categorising the transfer in terms such as ‘gift’ or ‘bribe’, as if these 
were universal forms of behaviour (an illustrative example can be seen in the practice of 
‘Guanxi’ in China – see Smart 1993). By keeping this issue in mind, however, it 
encourages the researcher to try and understand people on their own terms, to presume 
no universal morality, and to categorise action in relation to a broader set of social facts. 
Practices consequently preclude comparison, and this raises a profound issue for 
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normative economic science. We suggest that there must be an attempt to move beyond 
polythetic categorisation, and that this may only be possible by recognising the 
ontological basis of human interaction. Here we use the word ontology not as a 
‘predicate’, as Descola describes it, but in the critical realist sense, as the way the world 
must be for science to be possible.  
 
We have so far tried to establish that there is a distinction between goods and the property 
rights that people assign to them, and that neither aspect can be sacrificed for the sake of 
method. Instead, there is a modal ontological distinction between the two, which means 
that people have and share a knowledge of goods that corresponds to reality, albeit 
fallibly. Property rights are a transitive feature of social structure: they can pass between 
individuals, or people in unison, through discrete transfers (e.g. giving or exchanging). 
To give, to steal, or to share are all examples of transitive verbs which require an 
intermediary object for them to be intelligible.  For example, giving, stealing, and/or 
sharing only make sense if there is an object which a person can make use of, such as 
money, time, land or food.  We contend that transitivity is the basis on which all humans 
transform and/or reproduce cultural rules of appropriation and expropriation (note that 
here we are using the word transitivity to refer to the subject-predicate relation 
specifically, although as a knowledge claim it also clearly falls within what critical realists 
refer to as the ‘transitive domain’). These rules provide the basis for humans to create 
replicable, stable forms of interaction that allow both for property itself and for the 
relative rights that are assigned to property. In addition to this, property rights can be 
bestowed upon others without explicit interpersonal recognition (e.g. by decrees that give 
a whole population access to a resource), in which case the property rights of the whole 
social structure undergo a qualitative transformation. This leads to the conclusion that 
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structure, agency and culture are all fundamentally important when studying economies, 
and proper analysis must therefore involve a diachronic examination of multiple 
overlapping property rights. Changes in property rights over time reveal how people are 
enabled or constrained to participate in the economy. If people and the property rights 
between them are formally represented it is common for multiple relationships to exist 
simultaneously.  We refer to overlapping social relationships as multiplexity. All human 
life is bound up in relationships that overlap with goods and other people. The challenge 
for the anthropologist is to understand how these relationships exist, often in the absence 
of empirical data (e.g. for imagined relationships with deities).   
One other notable feature of human interaction is that, in many cases, we act on behalf of 
other people. In legal terminology, this sometimes gets called the agent-principal 
relationship. This 'institutional' form of agency is important for anthropologists who are 
involved in the process of examining the economy because the transactions in question 
often relate to political trade, tax, or redistribution. In the case of some anthropological 
fieldwork this is a challenging task for the interlocutor, particularly when the 
communities examined may not be tied to an obvious model of subjectivity. In all social 
groups people act with, for, and on behalf of other people. Examining whether people act 
on behalf of others can serve as a means to categorise decision-making as either individual 
or institutional. The decision to delineate individuals and/or institutions thus becomes a 
practical emic/etic question that is best answered by the question at hand. The way 
multiplexity constrains or enables property relations should be the focus of the 
anthropologist. This means that the method can be used either to examine how people 
self-conceptualise and describe their relations to an interlocutor or, alternatively, that it 
can be structured according to empirical observations. The aim should be to identify 
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which subset of people and deontic relations provide the greatest explanatory potential, 
such that generative mechanisms can be identified.   
 
Bhaskar (1998,13) suggested that the retroductive method moves through three steps: 1) 
Identify a phenomenon; 2) Construct explanations for it, and empirically test these 
explanations; 3) Identify generative mechanism at work, which subsequently becomes 
the phenomenon to be explained, and so on. In the context of the approach that was 
outlined in the previous section, the initial phenomena that are likely to be identified in 
economic anthropology are exchanges or circulations of objects. Economic interactions 
are emergent phenomena between two or more people (e.g. exchange, giving, or sharing), 
and they must therefore be classified through polythetic means; but, because interactions 
occur at different points in time, the transformation of property rights can be analysed 
diachronically rather than synchronically. Property rights precede production, 
consumption and exchange. This means that historical interactions can be examined for 
the presence of reciprocity and transitivity, allowing economic anthropologists to reveal 
how close a social structure is to the basic categories that are shown in the following table. 
In Table 1 we build on the definitions of property described earlier. We therefore provide 
a preliminary sketch of diachronic transformations of property rights by drawing on the 
ethnographic record for evidence of ontologically distinct modes of property rights 
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‘Brute’ intransitivity – the good is impossible to exclude from other people, thus 
sharing occurs by default e.g. air, sunlight, radiowaves  
 
‘Institutional’ intransitivity – property regime prohibits individuals from excluding the 












‘Positional’ giving – typically between people in different social positions e.g. adult-
child food sharing  
(e.g. Elder-Vass 2015) 
 
‘Prosocial exchange systems’ (e.g. Harvey 2014) 
 
‘Intracommunity’ gift giving – anonymous gifts between strangers at community 







                             
 
 
Intercommunity gift giving – trade between institutions e.g. Kula ring (Malinowski 
1922/1992) where objects must circulate 
 
Egoist gifts – attempts to demonstrate social status within an institution through giving 









Market exchange – requires commensurable objects and quantitative equivalence 
Balanced exchange – ritualised swapping of distinct but qualitatively equivalent 
objects   







Taxation e.g. Income Tax 
 






 Redistribution e.g. Welfare  
 
Digital peer-to-peer file sharing (e.g. Giesler 2006) – reciprocity is eschewed in favour 




Understanding how multiple spheres of exchange overlap with each other requires a 
broader understanding of how the objects in question relate to the cosmogony of the 
people involved, or in other words, how multiplexity influences agency. Empirical tests 
are unlikely to yield permanently fixed understandings of economic interaction, but this 
does not mean that they should simply be disregarded. Some of the most urgent political 
problems involve resource dilemmas that occur across multiplex property relations. In the 
archetypes of Sahlins and Polanyi that were described earlier the presence of reciprocity 
plays a central role. However, describing economic relations with so few essentialist 
categories removes the potential to explain transformation and novelty in social 
structures. Archetypes should therefore be resisted, unless there is clear empirical 
evidence for recurring relationships.  
 
We believe that a diachronic form of property right analysis can aid anthropologists in 
the process of retroductive reasoning. The equality of relationships between people is 
closely associated with moral questions about economics. For instance, the simplest form 
of indirect reciprocity that could emerge in an economy, rather than just dyadic 
reciprocity is shown in table 3 as the first complete triad.  By contrast, partially 
intransitive relationships reveal an imbalance between people, as well as potentially 
associated moral logics. Imbalance could be due to unconditional gifts or acts of sharing 
which, as described by Elder-Vass (2015), can only be properly explained if they are 
understood as positional giving i.e. when the people involved occupy distinct positions 
within a social structure.  The transformative power of agency in these relationships can 
only be fully explained where structure, agency and culture are all recognised as 
ontologically distinct.  
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With an appropriate dataset, the prevalence of forms can be described statistically, which 
can then serve as a basis for retroduction. Creating a dataset large enough for diachronic 
analysis requires that qualitatively distinct property rights are stated and that 
transformations are recorded through time. Collecting a historical dataset is a difficult 
task for researchers without the luxury of longitudinal studies, but it may become easier 
as more of the economy becomes mediated by computers (see for instance, the study of 
reciprocity on an accommodation sharing website by Lauterbach et al 2009).   
Implications and opportunities for future research  
‘The study of economic anthropology is ahead of us, not behind, but we must look back if 
we are to move forward. Economics has the ancient question of value at its core. 
Economic anthropology has broadened our conception of this problem by drawing 
attention to the coevality of contradictory value regimes.’  
   (Gregory 2009,297) 
 
Ethnography and interviews remain the most effective means of understanding the 
motivations of people within the many forms of political economy, but large-scale 
longitudinal studies can describe the statistical relations that occur as a consequence of 
property rights. Descriptive statistics can then be used to help identify the respective 
generative mechanisms at work and thus inform policy. Ostrom argued that there are no 
panaceas for developing political economy solutions (e.g. Ostrom et al. 2007). We believe 
mixed-method approaches are most likely to both reveal cultural tensions resulting from 
property rights and help shed light on potential solutions.    
  
There are many areas where a critical realist informed economic anthropology can 
provide insight. Resource dilemmas, for instance, are rife throughout international 
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politics at inter-governmental and intra-governmental levels. Understanding how access-
based property rights can work in the absence of alienable property rights is therefore 
arguably one of the most urgent political issues of the moment. This has two clear 
corollaries: 1) The way the ‘economy’ itself is measured; and 2) How politics can promote 
harmonious arrangements within and between different social groups. The emphasis on 
exchange within developed economies has led to the widespread assumption that 
quantitative growth in the possession and exchange of alienable property rights is the only 
morally legitimate political end (Appel, 2017). GDP and measures that privilege 
exchange have therefore come to be a largely unquestioned means through which moral 
progress is measured (Coyle, 2014). To challenge this dogma means redefining the terms 
of the debate, so that growth in exchange is no longer seen as a prerequisite for a 
functioning economy. The variety of existing economies demands that researchers find 
terms of comparison sufficiently nuanced to accommodate the mixture of metaphysical 
beliefs that people hold. We have argued that only diachronic analysis of multiplex 
property rights can properly illustrate the basis of economic cooperation, and that such 
forms of investigation are only possible with ethnographers and statisticians working in 
tandem. This also necessitates a grounding in ontological realism and epistemic 
relativism that the critical realist literature is best placed to provide. Economic 
anthropology has had a lasting influence on researchers, but it has struggled to maintain 
itself as a discipline in the 20th Century, primarily because of a failure of engagement 
between formalists and substantivists. Researchers from both heritages contributed 
enormously to our understanding of economic life around the world, but it is imperative 
that the ontological debate does not run out of steam. Critical realism may offer the most 
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